

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 01 OF 07 051128Z

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 FEA-01
NSC-05 TRSE-00 USIE-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00
/078 W

-----051229Z 065638 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4442

INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO

USDAO CARACAS

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AMGT, GY

SUBJECT: POLICY AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT REVIEW (PARM): GUYANA-
PART I

REF: (A) STATE 38356, (B) STATE 45461, (C) STATE 59006,
(D) CERP 0001

POLICY ASSESSMENT.

A. US INTERESTS.

1. US INTERESTS IN GUYANA ARE LIMITED, BUT BECAUSE IT IS
A KEY NATION -- IN SOME WAYS A PACEMAKER -- IN THE
CARIBBEAN, IT HAS GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THE US THAN DO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 01 OF 07 051128Z

MANY SIMILAR SIZE UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS ELSEWHERE. OUR
INTERESTS ARE RELATED TO BROAD LONG-TERM GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
GOALS OF ACHIEVING A MORE PEACEFUL AND STABLE WORLD,
SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE, HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION, US
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, AND THE HUMANITARIAN INTEREST OF
ASSISTING UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES ACHIEVE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

2. WORLD ORDER AND REGIONAL SECURITY. AS GUYANA IS AN ACTIVE AND INFLUENTIAL PARTICIPANT IN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND IN OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA, THE US HAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ASSURING THAT GUYANA'S ROLE IS MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO ISSUES IN WHICH CONTINUED RADICALIZATION BY GUYANA COULD CONTRIBUTE TO INSTABILITY OR RADICALIZATION OF OTHER CARIBBEAN NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE MINI-STATES WHICH TEND TO LOOK TO GUYANA FOR LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING THAT GUYANA'S BORDER DISPUTES ARE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY. FINALLY, THE US HAS A SECURITY INTEREST IN LIMITING THE INFLUENCE OF ITS ADVERSARIES, ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA, IN THE AREA.

3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION. GUYANA'S GOOD RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS--WHICH REMAIN INTACT BUT UNDER STRESS--COULD DETERIORATE OR BE DESTROYED IF THE PRESENT SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT EVOLVED TOWARD A COMMUNIST SYSTEM OR IT WAS REPLACED BY THE MARXIST-LENINIST OPPOSITION PARTY WHOSE LEADER, CHEDDI JAGAN, IS LINKED TO AND BACKED BY MOSCOW.

4. US ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. GUYANA REMAINS OUR PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF CALCINED BAUXITE. THE US REMAINS THE PRINCIPAL SUPPLIER OF GUYANA'S IMPORT MARKET (28 PERCENT IN 1976); HOWEVER, GIVEN GUYANA'S PRESENT LIQUIDITY CRISIS, SHOULD THE USSR AND OTHER COMECON COUNTRIES PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, A LONG-TERM REORIENTATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 00681 01 OF 07 051128Z

OF GUYANA'S TRADE COULD OCCUR. DEBT RESCHEDULING BY GUYANA WOULD ADVERSELY IMPACT ON GUYANA'S CREDITORS IN THE US, CANADA AND GREAT BRITAIN. THE US HAS AN INTEREST IN BOLSTERING GUYANA'S DETERMINATION TO SERVICE ITS DEBTS.

5. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. THE GOG HAS DIRECTED ITS DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AT IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ITS POOR PEOPLE AND AT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS. THE US HAS A HUMANITARIAN INTEREST IN THESE EFFORTS AND A LONG-TERM INTEREST IN HELPING GUYANA REALIZE ITS POTENTIAL AS A REGIONAL EXPORTER OF FOOD.

6. ALL OF THESE INTERESTS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF GUYANA'S "SOCIALIST THRUST." FOR THE US THIS PRESENTS A DILEMMA WHEREIN WE MUST DETERMINE WHETHER WE WILL SIMPLY TOLERATE GUYANA'S SOCIALISM WHILE DISENGAGING FROM HER DEVELOPMENT, OR WHETHER WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN LIMITED FASHION IN HER DEVELOPMENT, BOTH POLITICAL AND

ECONOMIC, IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF
HER SOCIALISM AND BEHAVIOR IN MULTILATERAL FORA. OUR
PERSPECTIVE HAS RAMIFICATIONS FOR OTHER REGIONAL INTERESTS
AND FOR THOSE POLICY OPTIONS WHICH MAY FACE US IN THE
FUTURE. THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESENT
POLICY TOWARD GUYANA CAN SIGNIFICANTLY BEAR UPON OUR
CONTINUING INTERESTS IN LIMITING THE INFLUENCE OF OUR
ADVERSARIES IN THE CARIBBEAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 02 OF 07 051137Z
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 FEA-01
NSC-05 NSCE-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00
/078 W

-----051230Z 065728 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4443
INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
USDAO CARACAS
CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

B. OVERVIEW.

7. IN US EYES, GUYANA HAS BECOME A "TROUBLEMAKER."
US-GUYANESE RELATIONS THROUGHOUT THE 1970'S DETERIORATED,
WITH EACH SIDE'S ACTIONS AND REACTIONS, OFTEN UNWITTINGLY,
GIVING IMPETUS TO THE NEGATIVE TREND. THE DYNAMICS OF THE
PROCESS INDUCED THE US TO CONCENTRATE ON DAMAGE-LIMITING
ACTIONS AND ON GIVING STRONG RESPONSES TO GUYANESE
"TROUBLEMAKING" RATHER THAN ON DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING
POLICIES INTENDED TO ELIMINATE CONFRONTATION AND
PROMOTE ACCOMMODATION. AS THE US AND GUYANA CAME TO VIEW
EACH OTHER AS BEING HOSTILE, US INFLUENCE IN GUYANA

DIMINISHED AND US INTERESTS IN GUYANA CAME UNDER
INCREASING THREAT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 02 OF 07 051137Z

8. US-GUYANA RELATIONS HIT A LOW FOLLOWING THE CUBANA
AIRLINER CRASH LAST YEAR WITH BURNHAM'S OCTOBER 17 SPEECH
WHICH, IN ADDITION TO AMOUNTING TO AN ACCUSATION THAT THE US
WAS INVOLVED WITH THE CUBAN EXILE TERRORISTS, WAS AN OUT-
POURING OF BITTERNESS OVER EVENTS IN US-GOG RELATIONS SINCE
1970. WITH THE ADVENT OF A NEW US ADMINISTRATION, THE TOP
GUYANESE LEADERS HAVE STATED THEY WANT IMPROVED RELATIONS
WITH THE US AND HAVE TAKEN SPECIFIC PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
STEPS TO SHOW THIS.

9. DESPITE THE PRESENT APPARENT DESIRE OF GOG LEADERS
FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, THE DYNAMICS THAT ADVERSELY
AFFECTED THE RELATIONSHIP IN THE PAST COULD RESURFACE AT
ANY TIME DUE TO ACCIDENTS, MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR THE
MALEVOLENT ACTIONS OF ANTI-US GUYANESE OR OUR FOREIGN
ADVERSARIES ON THE SCENE WHO ARE EVER-READY TO SOW SUSPICION
OF THE US IN GUYANESE MINDS. BECAUSE OF THESE AND OTHER
FACTORS PRESENT IN THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT, I DOUBT THAT THE
GUYANESE WOULD BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN THE DELICATE PROCESS
OF REVERSING THE SIX-YEAR DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP
UNLESS THEY ARE GIVEN ACTIVE US ENCOURAGEMENT AND THE US TAKES
APPROPRIATE INITIATIVES.

10. THE QUESTIONS BEFORE US ARE:
--WHETHER THE GOG DESIRE TO RESTORE GOOD RELATIONS
WITH THE US CAN BE SUSTAINED.
--WHETHER RESTORATION OF GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS
WOULD MODERATE GUYANA'S ANTI-US POSITION IN MULTILATERAL FORA.
--WHETHER THE US SHOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO A SOCIALIST GUYANA, PROVIDED
THAT IT WILL COOPERATE WITH THE US ON BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE US.

11. OUR JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE ANSWERS TO THESE
QUESTIONS IS BASED ON A MIXTURE OF POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE FACTORS WHICH ARE SUMMARIZED HEREIN.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 00681 02 OF 07 051137Z

12. GUYANA IN 1977 IS IN THE MIDST OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS
AND VERY PROBABLY POLITICALLY AT A FORK IN THE ROAD.

IT MAY HAVE TO CHOOSE EITHER TO MAINTAIN FREE INSTITUTIONS AND A RELATIVELY MODERATE PRAGMATIC SOCIALISM AND RETAIN ITS DEPENDENCE ON WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL OR TRY TO CONVERT TO AN AUTHORITARIAN SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND RELY PRIMARILY ON COMMUNIST SOURCES FOR ASSISTANCE. BURNHAM'S DEPENDENCE ON BLACK GUYANESE--THE SMALLER OF GUYANA'S TWO MAJOR RACIAL/CULTURAL GROUPS--AS HIS POLITICAL BASE WHEREAS THE BASE OF HIS RIVAL JAGAN IN THE LARGER (52 PERCENT) EAST INDIAN COMMUNITY, IS A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR BURNHAM DUE TO THE RACIAL RATHER THAN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION OF GUYANA'S POLITICS.

13. THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE HAVE ADDED TO THE THREAT THAT JAGAN POSES FOR BURNHAM. HIS GAMBIT FOR COPING WITH JAGAN DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS WAS TO TRY TO COURT THE SOVIETS AND CONCURRENTLY COAX JAGAN INTO A "NATIONAL UNITY" GOVERNMENT WHERE HE COULD, BURNHAM BELIEVED, BE "NEUTRALIZED." AS PART OF THE DEAL, JAGAN WOULD BRING WITH HIM A COMMITMENT OF SOVIET AID. THIS EFFORT HAS FALTERED, APPARENTLY BECAUSE BURNHAM'S TERMS FOR JAGAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE GOG DID NOT AMOUNT TO "POWER-SHARING" INSISTED UPON BY JAGAN AND BEHIND HIM HIS SOVIET BENEFACTORS. BURNHAM DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME DEPENDENT UPON ANYONE--THE SOVIETS OR THE US.

14. THE DECLINING ECONOMY IS ADVERSELY AFFECTING BURNHAM'S POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IF HE IS UNABLE TO OBTAIN BUDGET SUPPORT IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS FROM OTHER SOURCES HE MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO ACCEPT JAGAN'S TERMS. HE APPEARS TO RETAIN THE LOYALTY OF THE PREDOMINANTLY BLACK 3,100-MAN GUYANA DEFENCE FORCE (GDF), THE 2,200 POLICE AND THE 5,000-STRONG PEOPLE MILITIA. ALTHOUGH ABOUT 400 GDF SOLDIERS WERE TRAINED IN CUBA, IT IS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 GEORGE 00681 02 OF 07 051137Z

SIGNIFICANT THAT BURNHAM HAS SOUGHT AND OBTAINED BRITISH TRAINING ASSISTANCE AGAIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 03 OF 07 051147Z
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 CU-02 AGRE-00
AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
NSCE-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 PM-04 /078 W
-----051232Z 065832 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4444
INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
USDAO CARACAS
CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

15. THE GOG HAS TRIED TO DIVERSIFY ITS FOREIGN TRADE BUT IT REMAINS DEPENDENT UPON THE US (ITS PRINCIPAL SUPPLIER OF MANUFACTURED GOODS), GREAT BRITIAN AND WESTERN EUROPE FOR THE BULK OF ITS EXPORT SALES AND IMPORTS. AN IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE US WOULD TEND TO DEFLATE PRESSURES TO REORIENT GUYANA'S TRADE.

16. GUYANA'S FOREIGN DEBT, AS A RESULT OF THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BAUXITE AND SUGAR INDUSTRIES AND OTHER SMALLER SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, WAS US\$345.4 MILLION AT THE END OF 1976. THE GOG HAS MET ITS FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS TO DATE. THE TRADE MINISTER IN A MAJOR SPEECH MARCH 31, 1977, REAFFIRMED THAT GOG POLICY "AT ALL COST" WAS TO MEET INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

17. BURNHAM AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS APPEAR TO BELIEVE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 03 OF 07 051147Z

THAT THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS WILL EASE AFTER NEXT FALL'S SUGAR CROP IS HARVESTED. OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THE SITUATION IS WORSE THAN GOG OFFICIALS ADMIT AND THAT GUYANA WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO AVOID BEING FORCED TO SEEK DEBT RESCHEDULING. IN THE MEANTIME, IMPORTS ARE RESTRICTED TO THE BAREST NECESSITIES.

18. THE GOG IS SEEKING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM VARIOUS SOURCES. SO FAR, ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN MODEST. BRITISH ASSISTANCE PROBABLY WILL RUN ABOUT TWO MILLION POUNDS A YEAR. CANADA IS COMMITTED TO A US\$7 MILLION FORESTRY LOAN AND A US\$2 MILLION WATER PROJECT (BOTH PLANNED FOR 1979).

19. ALTHOUGH THE EEC IS CONTEMPLATING SEVERAL MAJOR PROJECTS, INCLUDING A FISH PROCESSING PLANT, NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED SO FAR. THE UNDP HAS PROGRAMMED US\$5.2 MILLION FOR ITS 1977-81 GUYANA PROGRAM, PRIMARILY SMALL PROJECTS IN FORESTRY, VETERINARY SERVICES, MAPPING AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IS PLANNING APPROXIMATELY US\$61 MILLION IN LOANS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT, FOOD CROP AND HEALTH PROJECTS. AGRICULTURAL, SEWAGE AND FORESTRY (IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EEC) PROJECTS ARE BEING PROGRAMMED BY THE WORLD BANK.

20. THE CURRENT UNITED STATES AID PIPELINE IN GUYANA AMOUNTS TO US\$8.7 MILLION CONCENTRATED ON LOAN PROJECTS IN RICE FACILITY, ROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION. ALL OF THESE PROJECTS ARE SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION BY THE END OF 1978.

21. THE GUYANESE HAVE APPLIED FOR ASSOCIATION WITH COMECON. THE SOVIETS DO NOT YET HAVE AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH THEY SENT AN ECONOMIC MISSION TO GUYANA IN OCTOBER 1976. CUBAN AID HAS INCLUDED MILITARY TRAINING IN CUBA, ARMS AND AMMUNITION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAL SERVICES AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 00681 03 OF 07 051147Z

FISHING. THEY ALSO WILL HELP IN THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE HAVE BUILT A CLAY BRICK FACTORY, ARE BUILDING A TEXTILE PLANT AND ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A TILE FACTORY, AS WELL AS A 500-BED HOSPITAL.

22. GUYANA HAS DEVELOPED A FOREIGN POLICY DESIGNED TO EARN IT INFLUENCE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, PROVIDE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN LIBERATION GROUPS, AND DEVELOP A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE CARIBBEAN. CONCURRENTLY, IT HAS AIMED AT GETTING LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE FROM COMMUNIST AND NON-ALIGNED -- OPEC-- COUNTRIES. THE "SOLIDARITY" ACQUIRED IN THE NAM AND COMMUNIST WORLD WAS TO SERVE AS A DETERRENT TO "DESTABILIZATION" ATTEMPTS OR OUTRIGHT AGGRESSION BY GUYANA'S NEIGHBORS. THE APPARENT FAILURE OF THIS POLICY TO ACQUIRE SOVIET AID AT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL COST APPEARS TO BE CAUSING A RETHINKING OF THE GOG'S FOREIGN POLICY.

23. SHOULD BURNHAM RETIRE OR DIE, HIS SUCCESSOR PROBABLY WOULD BE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PTOLEMY REID, OR MINISTER OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HOUSING HAMILTON GREEN, OR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE FRED WILLS. REID IS HONEST BUT LACKS ABILITY FOR POLITICAL MANEUVER AND INFIGHTING. HE PROBABLY WOULD LEAVE FOREIGN POLICY FOR WILLS TO FORMULATE AND MANAGE.

GREEN'S AMBITIONS TO LEAD GUYANA HAVE LONG BEEN BLATANT AND HE IS YOUNG, INTELLIGENT AND OPPORTUNISTIC. HE RECENTLY ATTACKED IN A CABINET MEETING THE GOG'S HEAVY INVOLVEMENT IN THE NAM AS A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY. HIS FOREIGN POLICY PROBABLY WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US THAN BURNHAM'S POLICIES HAVE BEEN. HIS CHIEF LIABILITY IS THAT HIS IDENTIFICATION WITH ELECTION FRAUD AND THUGGERY IN PAST ELECTIONS WOULD CAUSE GREAT APPREHENSION AMONG EAST INDIAN GUYANESE SHOULD HE COME TO POWER. OF ALL THE PNC LEADERS, FONMIN WILLS WOULD BE MOST ACCEPTABLE TO EAST INDIANS. HE IS A SOCIALIST, BUT PRAGMATIC, AND WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW MORE FAVORABLE POLICIES FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THAN HAS BURNHAM. HIS MAIN DRAWBACK IS HIS MERCURIAL NATURE. ALL THREE OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 GEORGE 00681 03 OF 07 051147Z

THE ABOVE MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTY CONSOLIDATING POWER.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 04 OF 07 051157Z

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 FEA-01
NSC-05 NSCE-00 INRE-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 SSO-00
/078 W

-----051233Z 065930 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4445

INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO

USDAO CARACAS

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

24. OPPOSITION LEADER JAGAN REMAINS UNPALATABLE FOR THE US.

JAGAN MAKES NO PRETENSE OF NON-ALIGNMENT, DOES NOT HIDE HIS UNABASHED ADMIRATION FOR THE SOVIET UNION, AND HAS SOVIET BACKING. FORTUNATELY HIS LINKS TO THE SOVIET UNION ARE SERIOUS DRAWBACKS FOR HIM AMONG THE GUYANESE PEOPLE. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S POPULARITY IS AT AN EBB, AND THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IS CAUSING DISCONTENT. THE POSSIBILITY OF JAGAN WINNING IN 1978 ELECTION CAN NO LONGER BE TOTALLY DISCOUNTED. ONCE IN POWER HE MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTY GOVERNING BECAUSE THE ARMY AND POLICE ARE CONTROLLED BY BLACK PNC SUPPORTERS AND THE RANK-AND-FILE ARE PREDOMINANTLY BLACK. HE COULD BE PROPPED UP, HOWEVER, BY SOVIET SUPPORT.

25. SIGNIFICANT NEW POSITIVE FACTORS AFFECTING US-GUYANA RELATIONS HAVE ENTERED INTO PLAY RECENTLY.THESE INCLUDE:
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 04 OF 07 051157Z

--THE ADVENT OF A NEW US ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS CAST OFF MUCH OF THE NEGATIVE US IMAGE OF THE PAST AND HAS PROJECTED THE FACT THAT IT IS CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND SENSITIVE TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS. A PUBLIC CLIMATE IS BEING CREATED IN WHICH PEOPLE IDENTIFY WITH THE US AND THE GOG CANNOT IGNORE THIS.

--SECRETARY VANCE CONVINCED FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS AND APPARENTLY BURNHAM THAT THE US ACCEPTS A SOCIALIST GUYANA AND THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GUYANA PROVIDED THAT GUYANA IMPROVES ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US.

--ALONG WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE US "DESTABILIZATION THREAT," AN IMPROVEMENT IN GUYANA-BRAZIL RELATIONS, AN EASING OFF, BUT NOT DISAPPEARANCE, OF GOG FEARS ABOUT VENEZUELA HAS TAKEN PLACE.

--BURNHAM'S CONCERN OVER SOVIET BACKING OF OPPOSITION LEADER CHEDDI JAGAN HAS INCREASED, ESPECIALLY AFTER EFFORTS TO COAX JAGAN INTO A "NATIONAL UNITY" GOVERNMENT RECENTLY COLLAPSED.

--BURNHAM'S HEART ATTACK MAY HAVE REDUCED HIS AMBITION AND, ALONG WITH THE SEVERE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE COUNTRY, APPEARS TO HAVE BROUGHT AN INCREASED SENSE OF REALISM TO GUYANA'S LEADERS.

--THE GUYANESE PEOPLE AND EVEN SOME GOG OFFICIALS ARE EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH ASPECTS OF GOG POLICY, SOME DISILLUSIONMENT WITH SOCIALISM, AND IN A RECENT CABINET MEETING THE IMPORTANT PLACE NON-ALIGNMENT OCCUPIES IN GOG FOREIGN POLICY WAS ATTACKED.

--THE GOVERNMENT PRESS NOW REGULARLY CARRIES ARTICLES, INCLUDING USIS WIRELESS FILE AND REUTER-CANA STORIES, ON THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE US ADMINISTRATION--SOMETHING THAT HAD NOT HAPPENED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH PRESS TREATMENT IS THAT IT HELPS PREPARE A PUBLIC CLIMATE AND ATTITUDES SUPPORTIVE OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US.

--FINALLY, BURNHAM, WILLS AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS

HAVE SAID PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT THEY WANT IMPROVED
RELATIONS WITH THE US.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 00681 04 OF 07 051157Z

26. THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE IN THE GOG ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE US DERIVE FROM SOME OF THE CONDITIONS LISTED ABOVE.
GUYANESE LEADERS APPEAR TO HAVE REALIZED THAT THEY DRIFTED
TOO FAR FROM THE US AND HAVE REMEMBERED THAT THE US IS THE
MAJOR POWER AND THE MAJOR SOURCE OF DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. AFTER GETTING
ASSURANCES ABOUT THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD GUYANA, THEY ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT
GUYANA'S SECURITY INTERESTS ARE BETTER SERVED BY FRIENDLY
RELATIONS WITH THE US THAN BY HOSTILITY. MANY GUYANESE
WERE DISTURBED OVER THE RECENT CRISIS IN US-GUYANA
RELATIONS AND THE GOG'S MOVEMENT TOWARD THE
SOVIET UNION AND CUBA.

27. THE BIGGEST SINGLE FACTOR MOTIVATING GUYANA'S
RECENT WARMTH TOWARD THE US, HOWEVER, IS THE HOPE THAT NOW
THE US WILL PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GUYANA. SIMILARLY
THE HOPE OF RECEIVING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE SOVIETS
WAS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN BURNHAM'S TURN TOWARD THE SOVIETS
TWO YEARS AGO AND THE GOG'S RADICAL BAHAVIOR IN THE NAM. AL-
THOUGH BURNHAM'S PRIDE SOMETIMES MAKES HIM EXTREMELY STUBBORN,
HE IS SUFFICIENTLY OPPORTUNISITC TO BEND HIS POLICIES AND
BEHAVIOR IN MULTILATERAL FORA TO ACCOMMODATE HIS MAIN BENEFACTOR--
BE IT THE USSR OR THE US.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 05 OF 07 051205Z
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 INRE-00 PM-04
CU-02 AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00
FEA-01 NSC-05 NSCE-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 /078 W
-----051234Z 066043 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4446
INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
USDAO CARACAS
CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

28. FROM OUR STANDPOINT, THE OPTION OF TRYING TO BUILD A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH BURNHAM OR A SUCCESSOR PNC GOVERNMENT AND GRAUDUALLY DRAW THE GOG BACK TOWARD MODERATION APPEARS TO BE THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. INITIALLY, WE SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTION WHILE ASCERTAINING THAT BURNHAM'S DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS IS GENUINE AND INCLUDES A WILLINGNESS TO MODERATE HIS POLICIES ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE US.

29. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION ARE BASED UPON OUR EVALUATION OF THE TOTAL SITUATION HERE. THEY ARE CAUTIOUS IN THAT MUCH OF WHAT WE RECOMMEND COSTS NOTHING BUT MERELY REQUIRES A NEW FOCUSING OF EFFORT AND A DEMONSTRATION OF INTEREST IN GUYANA, THE VIEWS OF ITS LEADERS AND ITS PROBLEMS. AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THIS STRATEGY IS A BILATERAL AID PROGRAM TOGETHER WITH DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 05 OF 07 051205Z

OTHER ACTION AS DELINEATED IN THE COURSES OF ACTION DESCRIBED BELOW.

C. OBJECTIVES.

30. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN GUYANA DURING THE NEXT 18-24 MONTHS SHOULD BE TO:
--DEVELOP IN GUYANESE LEADERS THE ATTITUDE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS A FRIEND, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLITICAL ENVIRONEMENT IN WHICH THEY FIND IT POLITICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO MAINTAIN GUYANA'S RELATIVELY GOOD RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MODERATE THEIR SOCIALIST THRUST, AND PURSUE POLICIES OF ACCOMMODATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.
--EFFECT A CHANGE IN GUYANA'S ROLE IN MULTIALTERAL FORA SO THAT SHE APPROACHES NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES WITH A SPIRIT OF ACCOMMODATION, AND ON EAST-WEST ISSUES SHE ADOPTS POSITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE US.
--MAINATIN US ACCESS TO CALCINED BAUXITE AND GUYANA'S IMPORT MARKET AND BOLSTER THE GOG'S DETERMINATION TO MEET ITS FOREIGN DEBT OBLIGATIONS.

31. COMMENT: WE HAVE GIVEN THE ATTITUDINAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OBJECTIVE FIRST PRIORITY BECAUSE WE CANNOT EFFECT A CHANGE IN GUYANA'S STANCE ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES UNLESS WE SUCCEED IN ACCOMPLISHING IT. OTHER OBJECTIVES INCLUDE LIMITING CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN GUYANA, ENCOURAGING THE PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, AND PROMOTING REGIONAL INTEGRATION, BUT THESE OBJECTIVES ALSO ARE LINKED TO OUR SUCCESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES LISTED ABOVE.

D. COURSES OF ACTION.

32. DEVELOP GUYANESE CONFIDENCE IN US. IN CONDUCTING OUR RELATIONS WITH GUYANA, WE SHOULD BE FIRM, CANDID, DIRECT AND CONSISTENT. WE SHOULD SHOW INTEREST IN AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 00681 05 OF 07 051205Z

AN UNDERSTANDING OF GUYANESE PROBLEMS. WE SHOULD SHOW INTEREST IN THEIR VIEWS ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES. TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE AND PRACTICAL, WE SHOULD SEEK TO CALM THEIR FEARS ABOUT DESTABILIZATION AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. (OBJECTIVES 1,2 AND 3).

33. BILATERAL AID. WE SHOULD INFORM THE GUYANESE IMMEDIATELY THAT WE ARE READY TO CONTINUE THE BILATERAL AID PROGRAM AND BEGIN DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING APPROPRIATE PROJECTS. INITIALLY, ANY COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND ANY EXPANSION DEFERRED UNTIL WE CAN ASCERTAIN WITH CLARITY THAT THE GUYANESE HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR RESOLVE TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH THE US ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT SUBSTANTIAL US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS CONDITIONED UPON OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN US-GOG RELATIONS. IN IMPLEMENTING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, WE SHOULD PROMOTE SOUND MANGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND ENCOURAGE DIVERSIFICATION OF GUYANA'S AGRO-INDUSTRIAL BASE AND UTILIZE THEM AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING AN IMPROVED DIALOGUE.

34. WE MUST REMAIN STEADY IF WE SUFFER SOME SETBACKS, ESPECIALLY INITIALLY IN GUYANA'S PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. GOG LEADERS WILL BE SENSITIVE TO ATTACK FROM THE OPPOSITION ABOUT HAVING SOLD OUT TO THE US.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 06 OF 07 051213Z
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 INRE-00 CU-02
AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 COME-00 FEA-01
NSC-05 NSCE-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 /074 W
-----051236Z 066158 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4447
INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
USDAO CARACAS
CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

35. PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS. WE SHOULD EXPLOIT AND REINFORCE THE POSITIVE IMPACT THAT RECENT USG POLICY STATEMENTS AND INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSISTANCE TO LDC'S, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE STYLE OF THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION, HAVE HAD ON GUYANESE LEADERS AND THE PUBLIC. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH PLACEMENT OF USIS MATERIAL IN THE MEDIA, PRIVATE MAILINGS OF MATERIAL TO KEY PEOPLE, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS AND DIRECT DIALOGUE.

36. FOCUS OF DIALOGUE. INTENSIFY DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN US AND TOP GOG OFFICIALS AND EXPAND THE DIALOGUE WITH OFFICIALS OF THE RULING PEOPLE'S NATIONAL CONGRESS (PNC) AND WITH PEOPLE IN MIDDLE AND LOWER SECTORS OF THE GOG AND STATE CORPORATIONS. IN THIS COMMUNICATION WE SHOULD SEEK TO IDENTIFY AND UNDERLINE POINTS OF CONVERGENCE OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 06 OF 07 051213Z

US AND GUYANESE INTERESTS ON MATTERS INCLUDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, POLITICAL DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS WELL AS MAKING CLEAR THOSE MATTERS ON WHICH WE DIFFER.

37. WE SHOULD OCCASIONALLY SCHEDULE VISITS TO

GUYANA BY UPPER-LEVEL US OFFICIALS. WHEN HIGH LEVEL GOG OFFICIALS VISIT WASHINGTON, EVEN WHEN THEIR MAIN PURPOSE IS NOT BUSINESS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, COUNTRY AND AREA OFFICERS SHOULD SEEK THEM OUT FOR DIALOGUE.

38. MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS. THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN PARA 36 ABOVE IS ESPECIALLY RELEVANT TO OUR DIALOGUE ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM SUCCESS, OUR APPROACH MUST BE CAREFULLY ORGANIZED TO SHOW SENSITIVITY TO GUYANESE INTERESTS WHILE PERSUASIVELY ENCOURAGEING GUYANA TO SHOW SIMILAR SENSITIVITY AND RESPONSIVENESS TO US INTERESTS. WE SHOULD TIRELESSLY DELINEATE THE ADVANTAGES OF ACCOMMODATION AND THE DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN CONFRONTATION.

39. GUYANA'S RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, VENEZUELA, AND SURINAM. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN GUYANA AND ITS NEIGHBORS TO REDUCE THE FEARS WHICH PROVIDE PART OF THE MOTIVATION FOR GUYANA TO SEEK ARMS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM THE CUBANS AND CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

40. OAS MEMBERSHIP. WE SHOULD SEEK THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE OAS CHARTER TO REMOVE THE OBSTACLES TO GUYANA'S MEMBERSHIP. ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE OAS WOULD ABSORB AND DIVERT GUYANA'S ENERGIES FROM MORE RADICALLY ORIENTED ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE NAM.

E. ISSUE: SHOULD THE US UNDERTAKE THE COURSES OF ACTION OUTLINED ABOVE, INCLUDING BEGINNING DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE CONCERNING POSSIBLE NEW BILATERAL LOANS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 00681 06 OF 07 051213Z

41. DISCUSSION: FOR VARIOUS REASONS INCLUDING GUYANA'S NATIONALIZATION OF KEY INDUSTRIES, ITS ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, AND ITS PAST PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, THE US BILATERAL AID PROGRAM SINCE 1970 HAS DECLINED TO THE POINT OF PHASING OUT. DURING THE PAST YEAR THE PRIMARY REASON THE US HAS NOT PROVIDED NEW LOANS WAS GUYANA'S CONSISTENT OPPOSITION TO US POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. THE GUYANESE PERCEPTION HAS BEEN THAT THE LACK OF NEW US AID WAS DUE TO THEIR BASIC DECISION TO DEVELOP A SOCIALIST ECONOMY. THEIR BEHAVIOR SINCE THEN HAS BEEN PART OF AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MORAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER SOURCES.

42. PRO: US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE SHOULD RELIEVE PRESSURES FOR GUYANA TO SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND PAY A HEAVY POLITICAL PRICE FOR IT. A US-GOG RELATIONSHIP INVOLVING AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO A

REORIENTATION OF GUYANESE OFFICIAL ATTITUDES AND POLICIES IN FAVOR OF US BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INTERESTS. BY ATTEMPTING THIS NOW WE HAVE A CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THIS.

43. RECOGNIZE THAT A BILATERAL AID PROGRAM IN ITSELF IS NOT AN EFFECT SANCTIONING INSTRUMENT FOR USE IN INFLUENCING A GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH IT DEEMS CONTRARY TO OTHER IMPORTANT GOALS. HOWEVER, AN ONGOING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CAN CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO AN ENVIRONMENT FAVORABLE TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF US OBJECTIVES. IN GUYANA, FOR HISTORICAL REASONS OUTLINED ABOVE AND CURRENT ECONOMIC REASONS, THE AID PROGRAM HAS SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 00681 07 OF 07 051217Z
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 INRE-00 PM-04 CU-02
AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 COME-00 FEA-01
NSC-05 NSCE-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 EB-08 /078 W
-----051238Z 066209 /13

O R 042100Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4448
INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
USDAO CARACAS
CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 7 OF 7 GEORGETOWN 0681

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

44. WITHOUT AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, OUR OTHER EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE GOG FROM MOVING TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, TO ENCOURAGE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RETENTION OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS, AND ENCOURAGE MODERATION IN MULTILATERAL FORA WOULD BE SERIOUSLY WEAKENED. IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF US ASSISTANCE, GUYANA, WE WOULD FOR A TIME AT LEAST LOSE OUR POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE GUYANA. WE LOSE LITTLE BY BEGINNING DISCUSSION WITH GUYANESE ABOUT NEW ASSISTANCE PROJECTS; SHOULD THE GOG'S

CURRENT EFFORTS TO CULTIVATE THE US END OR THE GOG BEGIN
VIOLATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE OR IT MOVE DECISIVELY
TOWARD AUTHORITARIANISM, THE US COULD STOP IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AID PROGRAM.

45. CON: BY PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO GUYANA, WE WOULD BE
HELPING A SOCIALIST COUNTRY IN THIS HEMISPHERE TO DEVELOP.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GEORGE 00681 07 OF 07 051217Z

IF SUCCESSFUL, GUYANA MIGHT OFFER AN ATTRACTIVE MODEL FOR
OTHER STATES IN THE AREA. GUYANA MIGHT NOT CARRY OUT HER
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US AND MIGHT TAKE
STANCES IN MULTILATERAL FORA CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS.
EVEN WITH THE PROVISION OF AID AND RECONCILIATION WITH
THE US, GUYANA WOULD CONTINUE A RELATIONSHIP WITH
CUBA. NOR COULD IT BE EXPECTED TO DROP OUT OF THE NON-
ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE BEST WE COULD EXPECT WOULD BE MODERATION
IN GUYANA'S APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS IN WHICH THE US HAS
AN INTEREST.

46. PROJECTION: IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN ACCOMPLISHING THE
OBJECTIVES OUTLINED, EIGHTEEN MONTHS FROM NOW GUYANA WILL
HAVE MODERATED HER APPROACH TO NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES AND SHOULD
SUPPORT THE US AT LEAST PART OF THE TIME ON ISSUES WHICH
HAVE AN EAST-WEST SIGNIFICANCE. GUYANA SHOULD BE MUCH MORE
RECEPTIVE TO US PERSUASION THAN IT HAS BEEN IN RECENT YEARS.
BLACKEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CERP 0001
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 04-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GEORGE00681
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770118-0127
Format: TEL
From: GEORGETOWN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770492/aaaadcsl.tel
Line Count: 849
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 093f01ab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 16
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 STATE 38356, 77 STATE 45461, 77 STATE 59006
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2910724
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POLICY AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT REVIEW (PARM): GUYANA- PART I
TAGS: PFOR, AMGT, GY
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/093f01ab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009